Indiana Law Journal
Volume 27

Issue 2

Article 2

Winter 1952

Contracts: A Law of Rights, Powers, Privileges and Immunities
Hugh Evander Willis
Indiana University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Contracts Commons

Recommended Citation
Willis, Hugh Evander (1952) "Contracts: A Law of Rights, Powers, Privileges and Immunities," Indiana Law
Journal: Vol. 27 : Iss. 2 , Article 2.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol27/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

CONTRACTS: A LAW OF RIGHTS, POWERS,
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
HUGH EVANDER WILLIS*

What is the correct rationale of the law of contracts? Is the
Anglo-American law of contracts a body of rights, powers, privileges
and immunities?' Can this terminology advanced by Hohfeld be satisfactorily employed to rationalize the law of contracts?
The law of contracts is that specific part of the general law which
applies social control to freedom of confract. Social control delimits
freedom; it does not make it. Yet, in contract law, so far as the making
of contracts and the terms of contracts are concerned, freedom is the
general rule. The parties are free to make or not to make a contract,
and, if they decide to make a contract, to determine .all of their rights
and duties and some powers, privileges and immunities under the contract,
and all other matters of substance. They may measure bargain considerationl, insert conditions modifying their duties of immediate performance, promise the impossible, and even choose between different kinds of
contracts. In the struggle between freedom of contract and social control, freedom of contract finally won the privilege of assigning contract
rights, of creating rights in third party beneficiaries, and of making joint
and joint and several contracts. This is democracy with a vengeance, because the legal relations found in contracts are created, not by a majority
of the people or by their legislative or judicial representatives; but by the
parties to the contracts themselves.
In Anglo-American law, the social control applied to contracts
may relate (1) to limitations of the power to make contracts; (2) to
requiring contracts or their substance; (3) to prescribing the formalities
of contracts; (4) to granting the privilege of the avoidance of contracts
for the protection of interests other than those in promised advantages;
and (5) to furnishing remedies (legal and equitable) and legal redress
* B.A., -1897, M.A., 1899, LL.D., 1925 Yankton College; LL.B., 1901, LL.M.,
1902, University of Minnesota; Professor Emeritus, Indiana University School of Law.
1. For the hypothesis that rights, powers, privileges and immunities are fundamental legal concepts which rationalize all branches of the law, see Hohfeld, Soie
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE LJ. 16
.(1913). As used in the following discussion a legal right means the legal capacity to
enforce action or forbearance (performance) by another. Its correlative is duty. A
legal privilege is the legal capacity to do as one pleases in a certain matter. Its
correlative is inability (no right). A legal power is the legal capacity to change or
create new legal capacities or liabilities for others. Its correlative is liability (no
imminity). A legal immunity is the legal capacity to be free from the legal power
or control of another. Its correlative is disability (no power).

CONTRA CTS
for the breach of contracts.

There are 'some contracts which the law

will not permit the parties to make and which it declares illegal, because
their subject-matter would be against public policy. There are a very
few contracts, such as compulsory automobile insurance contracts, which
the parties are required to make, and there are some contracts where
specific terms, as in the case of minimum wage and hour provisions and
standard uniform acts, must be inserted because required by law. There
are also cases where, though the parties have made a contract, the law,
in order to protect social interests other than that in promised advantages,
will give one of the parties the power to avoid his contract. Illustrations
of this sort of social control are found where one of the parties is an
infant or non compos nmentis, or where fraud, duress, or undue influence
has been exercised upon one of the parties to a contract. In all of the
above instances, social control affects the freedom of the parties as to
matters of substance, but only to a limited extent, so that even here the
role of the parties bulks larger than does that of society.
When considering the formalities of contracts, however, the rule
is very different. Here, freedom of contract disappears, and everything
is fixed and determined by law. It is true that the law gives the parties
a choice between four different types of contracts: the seal, the moral
consideration, the injurious reliance, and the bargain consideration types
(although in practical experience there is a choice only between the first
and the last) ; but the parties must obey the essentials prescribed for
whichever type of contract they choose or their efforts will be in vain.Thus, the essentials for a contract under seal are a promise, a writing, a
seal and delivery ;3 for a contract for moral consideration, a promise and
either a prior legal obligation 4 or a receipt of prior pecuniary benefits ;5
for a contract based on injurious reliance, a promise and a definite and
2. Willis, Key to Understanding the Law of Contracts, 34 KY. L.J. 171-6 (1945).
The Restatement of the American Law Institute, Sections 85-110, recognizes these differcnt types of contracts, but treats the topics of promise for moral consideration and injurious reliance under the heading Informal Contracts without Assent or Consideration,
and states that cohsideration is not requisite for the formation of such contracts. It
will be shown that the Restatement's conclusion is erroneous.
3. Crowley v. Lewis, 239 N.Y. 264, 146 N.E. 374 (1925) ; Moore v. Trott, 162 Cal.
268, 122 Pac. 462 (1912) ; Warren v. Lynch, 5 Johns. 239 (N.Y. 1800).
4. Niblack v. Goodman, 67 Ind. 174 (1879); Earle v. Oliver, 2 Ex. 71, 154 Eng.
Rep. 410 (1848); Eastwood v. Kenyon, 11 A. & E. 438, 113 Eng. Rep. 482 (Q.B. 1840).
5. Park Falls State Bank v. Fordyce, 206 Wis. 628, 238 N.W. 516 (1931) ; Holland
v. Martinson, 119 Kan. 43, 237 Pac. 902 (1925) ; Bagaeff v. Prokopik, 220 Mich. 265, 180
N.W. 427 (1920) ; Edson v. Poppe, 24 S.D. 466, 124 N.W. 441 (1910) ; Muir v. Kane,
55 Wash. 131, 104 Pac. 153 (1909); Mohr v. Rickgauer, 82 Neb. 398, 117 N.W. 950
(1908); Ferguson v. Harris 39 S.C. 323, 17 S.E. 782 (1893); Gray v. Hamil, 82 Ga.
375, 10 S.E. 205 (1889) ; Landis v. Royer, 50 Pa. 95 (1868) ; Boothe v. Fitzpatrick, 36
Vt. 681 (1864) ; Wilson v. Edwards, 24 N.H. 517 (1852) ; Bentley v. Morse, 14 Johns.

468 (N.Y. 1817).
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substantial reliance ;6 and for the bargain contract, an offer and acceptance,
bargain consideration, and frequently something to satisfy a Statute of
Frauds. 7 These are the formalities prescribed by the law for the making
of contracts, and the parties cannot make a contract in any other way.
Thus freedom of contract is not permitted to touch formalities. What
has been said with reference to the formalities for the making of contracts
also applies to the unmaking, or discharge, of contracts, and to the legal
redress for breach of contracts.
The law's limitations on the power to make contracts, requiring contracts or their substance, granting the privilege of avoidance of contracts
and furnishing remedies and legal redress, though all forms of social
control and therefore a part of the law of contracts, offer little difficulty
for rationale because, being so firmly established, are all well accepted.
They are all for the protection of sufficient social interests and involve
simple rights, powers and privileges.
The rationale does become difficult, however, when considering the
formalities. Here the law is more complex and the problems more numerous; for this reason there is no general agreement as to the proper
rationale. The chief problems relate to offer and acceptance, bargain
consideration, conditions, and the Statute of Frauds.
OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE

Should a contract be defined in terms of agreement, or in terms of
rights, powers, privileges and immunities? When social control, in the
guise of formalities, is applied to freedom of contract, does it require
an agreement as an operative fact, or a promise or set of promises, and
in one type of contract offer an acceptance?
In Anglo-American law an agreement is not required for any kind
of a contract, and a contract should not be defined as an agreement. The
operative facts required for the creation of a contract are either a promise
and a seal, a promise and moral consideration, a promise and injurious
reliance, or a promise, offer and acceptance and bargain consideration. A
contract should be defined as the legal relation, or relations, created by the
promises of the parties, the remedies and legal redress provided by law
(on subjects permitted by law), and the formalities prescribed by law.
6. A-mEs, CASES ON EOUITY, 306-309 (1904) ; Basick Mfg. Co. v. Riley, 9 F2d
138 (Pa. 1925) ; Siegel v. Spear, 234 N.Y. 479, 138 N.E. 413 (1923) ; Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Realty Co., 220 Mo. 522, 119 S.W. 400 (1909) ; Devecmon v. Shaw, 69 Md.
199, 15 Ati. 464 (1889) ; Presbyterian Church of Albany v. Cooper, 112 N.Y. 517, 20
N.E.352 (1889).
7. Tinn v. Hoffman & Co., 29 LT. 271 (1873) ; Gurfein v. VWrerbelovsky, 97 Conn.
703, 118 Atl. 32 (1922).
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The chief relations in a contract are right-duty-in-personam (or legal
obligation) relations. A contract can, therefore, be defined as a legal
obligation.
Offer and acceptance are required by the law only in bargain contracts. A promise-an undertaking by the promisor to do or not to do
something, or that something will or will not be done in the future-is
required for all kinds of contracts. It requires relinquishment of a
privilege. An offer is a conditional promise by the offeror to the offeree,
which gives the offeree the power to make a contract by an act (unilateral
contract) or by a promise (bilateral contract), within the time, in the
manner, and at the place authorized by the offeror either expressly or by
implication of law. An acceptance is the exercise of the power to make
a contract vested in the offeree by the offeror. Offer and acceptance are
therefore rationalized by the law of powers. If the offeree exercises his
power prior to legal revocation thereof, there is a contract even though
there is no agreement, or mutual assent, or meeting of the minds.
Blackstone was responsible for introducing the concept of agreement into Anglo-American contract law ;" the source of his misconception
remains a mystery. It certainly did not come from the action of special
assumpsit, which was the origin of both bargain consideration and the
consideration of injurious reliance. Following Blackstone, English and
United States judges for a time tried to rationalize their decisions by
using the agreement theory; and they were fairly successful so long as the
parties to contracts dealt with each other face to face; but when they
began to deal at a distance and to use the instrumentalities of the mail,
telegraph, etc., and the possibility of mistakes increased, the judges were
confronted with the alternatives of either declaring that there was no
contract or making new contract law. For the sake of justice and a
better law they chose to make new contract law-the law of offer and
acceptance, as a substitute for agreement. Before doing so an attempt
was made to find an agreement, in the case of mistakes, by resorting
to the device of a common agent, but the fallacy of this scheme soon
became apparent. First, to say that either party could by unilateral action
make his agent the agent of the other, was fallacious. Secondly, it was
a contradiction to find a common agency only for purposes of acceptance
but not for purposes of revocation or rejection. When these defects
became obvious, there was nothing left but to use the concepts of promise
and offer and acceptance for the rationalization of these decisions.
8. Blackstone
do or not to do a
9. The writer
acceptance, before

defined a contract as "an agreement, upon sufficient consideration, to
particular thing." 2 BL. Comm. *422.
presented his views on the definition of a contract, and on offer and
the members of the American Law Institute in a meeting in Wash-
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Yet all the text writers on contracts, with the exception of Professor
Williston, continued to define a contract as Blackstone had done, i.e., as
an agreement, and to rationalize the law of contracts in terms of agreement. 10 The result was to give to the Anglo-American world a text law
different from the case law. Mr. Williston realized that there was no
agreement required in the contract under seal, the contract for moral
consideration, or the contract created by injurious reliance, and that in
the bargain contract, actual (subjective) agreement was not required. He
therefore defined a contract as "a promise or set of promises" but he
still considered the bargain contract as requiring an "objective agreement." 11 His definition, instead of defining a contract in terms of what
it is, defines it in terms of how it is created. Moreover, he names only
one operative fact necessary for its creation. This so-called "objective
agreement" is in fact, of course, no agreement at all. It is simply another
name for offer and acceptance. The Restatement of the American Law
Institute has essentially followed the position of Mr. Williston as to
bargain contracts: the result is not a restatement of Anglo-American law
as it is found in the decisions of the courts; it is essentially a slavish
following of the concept introduced by Blackstoie. Although ,the American Law Institute professes to follow a policy of not reforming the law,
its effort in the field of contracts culminated in a substitution of textbook
law for that developed by the courts. To make matters worse, the change
is detrimental to a proper understanding of this most basic field of the
law. Some day, perhaps, we shall have a restatement of the Restatement.
There is abundant proof that the rationale advanced above is correct. Never has "agreement" been required in three kinds of contracts:
those under seal, for moral consideration, and those based on injurious
reliance. These contracts have had a long and honored history from
the time of, the Normans down to the present, in both England and the
United States, and they were all recognized in the time of Blackstone.
In the light of these facts it is singular, to say the least, that Blackstone
ington which was called to consider the final draft of this part of the Restatement. 3
PROCEEDINGS A.L.I. 173, 183, 190, 193, 195, 204 (1925) ; 7 PROCIINGS A.L.I. 205, 207,
269-72, 276, 279, 292 (1928-29). He won to his side some of the ablest members of the
institute and an overwhelming majority of the total membership. Instead of voting
on the question, the Institute referred it to the Council. Mr. Mathews, a prominent
attorney of Boston and a member of the Council, volunteered to guarAntee that the
Council would substitute all of the ideas and phraseology of the writer for that of
Mr. Williston; but Mr. Mathews' death within a short time thereafter terminated
his guarantee. The Council then compromised. It adopted the definition of offer desired
by Mr. Williston and the definition of acceptance desired by the writer.
10. This has been done by Addison, Anson, Bishop, Black, Chapman, Chipman,
Chitty, Clark, Elliott, Fry, Hare, Harriman, Harris, Helm, Lawson, Leake, Lee, Metcalf, Morawetz, Page, Parsons, Pollock, Salmond, Story, Street, and Wharton.
11. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, §§22-23 (1936).
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defined a contract as an agreement. Whether he made this mistake out
of ignorance or out of an attempt to reform the law, his definition undoubtedly made it difficult for these different types of contracts to
compete with the developing bargain contract. Other text writers copied
Blackstone's definition; judges in the nineteenth century tried to substitute a law of agreement for all other types of contract; and in the
United States even legislators joined in the battle, but all of their efforts
failed to destroy these well established contracts. They succeeded in
changing the nature ofthe requirement of a seal12 and the nature of the
requirement of delivery in the contract under seal, 13 but it remains a
valid type of contract. Lord Mansfield's doctrine of moral consideration
was so vigorously attacked that it was restricted to prior legal obligations.
In the twentieth century, however, it has been extended to also include
prior pecuniary benefits, and it remains an important type of contract.' 4
The consideration of injurious reliance was hardy enough to withstand
the attack levied against gratuitous promises to convey land, gratuitous
promises of a license, charitable subscriptions, other gratuitous promises
of gifts, gratuitous undertakings of bailees, and promises of waiver.
As a result, the contract based on injurious reliance has continued to
thrive.' 5 Hence today, as much as in Blackstone's day, it is error to
define a contract as an agreement, when there are three types of contracts
which do not require this element. Mr. Williston, in eliminating the
term in his definition of a contract, has done a better job than other text
writers.
If agreement was ever required by the bargain contract, it is not
so required today. In bargain contract cases there may be three typical
situations: (1) where there is an agreement but no offer and acceptance,
(2) where there is both an agreement and an offer and acceptance, and
(3) where there is an offer and acceptance but no agreement.
Where there are both an agreement and offer and acceptance, it
would be impossible to say that the rationale is either one or the other,
because there would be a contract no matter what a court might say about
the rationale. Where there is an agreement but no offer and acceptance,
Mr. Williston contended that there was a contract. If there are any cases
which so hold, it would have to be admitted that the rationale might be
agreement; but neither the wkiter nor Mr. Williston has found such a
12. Hawkberry v. Metz, 91 W. Va. 637, 114 S.E. 240 (1922).
13. Herman v. Jorgenson, 263 N.Y. 348, 189 N.E. 449 (1934).
14. Willis, Rationale of Past Consideration and Moral Consideration, 19 IowA L.

REv. 395 (1934).
15. Comment, 48 YALE L.J. 1036 (1939).
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case. 16 Furthermore, the cross-offer cases hold that there is no contract
in case of an agreement without offer and acceptance. In these cases
there may be a perfect agreement, mutual assent and meeting of the
minds bf the parties upon the same thing in the same sense. Yet, in the
cross-offer case of Tinn v. Hoffman,"1 the court held that there was no
contract because there 'was no acceptance. This authority for the proposition that an agreement alone will not make a contract has continued
to be the accepted doctrine. Mr. Williston, himself, concedes that crossoffers do not make a contract.
Where there is an offer and acceptance but no agreement, there is
a contract. The authority for this proposition derives from those cases
where, through a mistake or the carelessness of the offeror or his agent,
a bid or offer sent by mail or telegraph is not what the offeror intended,
so that, when the offeree accepts the bid or offer, there is no agreement,
or meeting of the minds. In such cases there is an offer and acceptance,
and the giving of the power to make a contract and an exercise of the
power; it is the law that there is a contract.-" The only possible rationale
is found in the law of offer and acceptance, which must be rationalized
by the law of powers. There are no facts to support any other rationale.
Thus, Mr. Williston and the Restatement were wrong in rationalizing a bargain contract as an agreement; the other text writers were wrong
in defining a contract as an agreement-. Mr. Williston likewise erred in
defining a contract as a promise or set of promises. Contracts is a law
of rights, powers, privileges and immunities, and should be defined and
rationalized by the use of these terms. Instead of agreement AngloAmerican law requires offer and acceptance created by the use of powers.
BARGAIN CONSIDERATION

Must the formal consideration which is required for the making of
a contract always be bargain consideration? Is bargain consideration
always a legal right, power, privilege or immunity; or may it also sometimes be any act or promise?
Consideration in Anglo-American law is not confined to bargain
consideration. There have been and still are three kinds of consideration;
(1) the moral consideration of the antecedent facts (rights) of either a
16. However, at one time, Mr. Williston thought he had found a hypothetical
situation, in which there was an agreement but no offer and acceptance, namely, where
a third person stated the promises for two other parties who answered "yes" when
they were asked if they agreed to them. But later, Mr. Williston admitted to the
writer that in such a case there were two offers and two acceptances.

17. 29 L.T. 271 (1873).
18. Ayer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 79 Me. 493, 10 Ati. 495 (1887); Steinmeyer
v. Schroeppel, 229 Ill. 9, 80 N.E. 564 (1907).
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prior legal obligation or a receipt of prior pecuniary benefits, 19 (2) the
consideration of the subsequent fact (privilege) of injurious reliance
(that is, reasonable and justifiable reliance and action thereon), gratuitous promises to convey land, gratuitous promises of a license, charitable subscriptions, gratuitous promises of other gifts, gratuitous
promises of bailees, or promises of waiver, 20 and (3) the bargain consideration of the contemporaneous fact of a legal right, power, privilege,
or immunity bargained for and given or promised in exchange for a
promise. In the case of exchange of sums of money the consideration
on one side must be equivalent to that on the Other. 21 Moral consideration
involves benefit to the promisor, while injurious reliance and bargain
consideration involve detriment to the promisee.
Most text writers have defined consideration as benefit to the
promisor or detriment to the promisee, 22 and, while consideration may
sometimes be benefit and sometimes detriment, this definition is highly
inaccurate in that it gives the impression that consideration must always
be either benefit to the promisor or detriment to the promisee regardless
of the type of contract involved. If this way of defining consideration
is to be follwed, the definition should state when benefit is required and
when dertiment is adequate. But even this would not be a satisfactory
definition without a description of the benefit and-the detriment, since
detriment in bargain consideration cases is very different from detriment
in the injurious reliance cases. It follows that this method of defining
consideration results in nothing but confusion and complications. A few
text writers have defined consideration exclusively as detriment to the
promisee. 23 In addition to all the evils mentioned above, this definition
is absolutely inaccurate insofar as it concerns moral consideration. Other
text writers have defined consideration as bargain detriment. 24 This
definition is inaccurate either in wholly ignoring moral consideration and
injurious reliance or in giving them a false definition. There is also a
dispute among the writers as to what is bargain detriment. Therefore
no attempt should be made to give one definition which includes all kinds
of consideration; but moral consideration, the consideration of injurious
reliance, and bargain consideration should each be defined separately.
19. Willis, Rationale of Past Consideration and Moral Consideration, 19

REv. 395 (1934).
20. Comment, 48 YALE L.J. 1036 (1939).

IOWA

L.

21. Willis, Considerationin the Anglo-American Law of Contracts,8 INI). L.J. 93,
153 (1932); Willis, Rationale of Bargain Consideration, 27 GEO. L.J. 414 (1939).
22. The following are texts of this sort: Addison, Anson, Chitty, Hare, Page,
Parsons, Salmond, Story, Wharton.
23. The following are texts of this sort: Elliott, Lawson, Leake.

24. The following are texts of this sort: Pollock, Williston.
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Yet, the Restatement of the American Law Institute has chosen to
define consideration in terms of only one kind; and has attempted to
dispose of the problems of moral consideration and injurious reliance
consideration by abolishing them. The Restatement states that these contracts may be created without assent or consideration, 2 5 and then proceeds
to name as such contracts the factual situations which have historically
been held to create moral consideration and injurious reliance. It would
almost seem that the Restatement was trying to stultify itself. Why is
there to be liability in the future on promises given for these considerations? Not because of moral consideration or injurious reliance,
although that is why the promises are enforceable and have always been
enforced, but because of the fiat of the Restatement. After this fiat, one
must not ask why the promises are enforceable. How can the legal world
ultimately do anything but repudiate a so-called Restatement of this
sort ?
Bargain consideration consists of a legal right, power, privilege,
or immunity (other than a power to do an illegal act), bargained for and
given or promised in exchange for a promise. In bilateral contracts,
the doctrine of mutuality of consideration (based on a mutual assumption) applies, and unless both parties furnish sufficient consideration,
neither party is bound. Bargain consideration may be given to the
promisor or some other person, or by the promisee or some other person.
When the consideration is actually given, one half of the contract is
executed and it is then called unilateral; when the consideration is only
promised, the contract is executory and it is called bilateral: however,
the consideration is required to be the same in both cases. The consideration, also, .must be the same whether the contract is voidable or valid,
or relates to prexisting legal duties and forbearance to sue, on the one
hand, or other kinds of contracts, on the other. It is a form of detriment
to the promisee.
There are three lines of authority for all of the foregoing statements.
In the first place, any legal, right, power, privilege, or immunity is always
sufficient for any bargain consideration ;26 there are no cases which have
held otherwise.. Indeed, all sorts of property rights, privileges (like the
privilege of 'drinking intoxicating liquors) and powers (like the power
of acceptance), have been held sufficient for bargain consideration.
Secondly, the forbearance to sue and the pre-existing duty cases have
25. RESTATEMIENT, CONTRACTS § 85 (1932).
26. Cox v. A.P. Green Fire Brick Co., 230 Mo. App. 774, 75 S.W.2d 621 (1934);
Briggs v. Miller, 176 Wis. 321, 186 N.W. 163 (1922); Orr v. Orr, 181 Il. App. 148
(1913) ; White v. McMath & Johnson, 1.27 Tenn. 713, 156 S.W. 470 (1913); Hamer
v. Sidway, 124 N.Y. 538, 27 N.E. 256 (1891).
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held that nothing other than a legal right, power; privilege, or imnmnity
will be sufficient bargain consideration,2 7 and an attempt tb rationalize
these cases in any other way is a false rationalization. Forbearance to
sue or a promise not to sue on a doubtful claim which is reasonable
and honestly asserted is sufficient bargain consideration because of
the privilege to sue; but if any one of the elements are lacking in these
situations there would be no consideration because there would be no
28
privilege to sue-indeed it would be malicious prosecution to do so.
In the case of a promise by a third person to two parties under mutual
contractual obligations, in return for their performance of that obligation,
there is sufficient bargain consideration because of the parties relinquishment of their privilege to rescind.2 9 Thirdly, there are no cases, when
properly rationalized, which hold that any thing other than a legal right,
power, privilege, or immunity will be sufficient bargain consideration.
Instead the cases hold that where these elements are lacking, the resulting
illusory promise will not be sufficient.3"
Yet, the late Dean Ames took the position that there were two
theories of bargain consideration, (he said "consideration," but of course
he meant bargain consideration). One theory, found in forbearance to
sue and pre-existing duty cases, required a legal right, power, privilege
or immunity; the other theory, found by him in doubtful claims cases
and third party promise cases, in infant's, and other voidable contracts,
and in conditional promises, compromises and power to cancel cases, did
not require a legal right, power, privilege or immunity, but only some act
or some promise (that is, any act or promise). The Restatement ostensibly adopts the "any act or promise" theory of bargain consideration
(it too says only "consideration") ;31 but in Sections 76 and 78 it excludes,
in forbearance to sue and pre-existing duty cases, any act or promise
other than a legal right, power, privilege or immunity, so that it is a
reasonable conclusion that the Restatement follows the rationale of Dean
Ames.
Dean Ames championed his theory of any act or promise in the
different kinds of cases enumerated, because, he said, the considerationgiver did not give or promise to give a legal right, power, privilege or
immunity, but only gave or promised to do so if he chose. 32 However,
the consideration-giver made no such condition or statement. Had he
27.
28.
29.
30.

Blount v. Wheeler et al., 199 Mass. 330, 85 N.E. 477 (1908).
Cook et aL. v. Wright, 1 Best & S. 559, 121 Eng. Rep. 822 (Q.B. 1861).
De Cicco v. Schweizer, 221 N.Y. 431, 117 N.E. 807 (1917).
Great Northern Ry. v. Witham, L.R. 9 C.P. 16 (1873).
31. RESTATEMENT, Co0NRAcrs § 75 (1932).
32. Ames, Two Theories of Consideration, 12 HARV. L. RaV. 515; 13 id. 29 (1899).

-
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done so, his act or promise would have been made illusory and void. There
would be no promise and no contract. In the case of voidable contracts,
infants and persons on whom fraud, duress, or undue influence has been
practiced have been given the power to avoid their contracts for the
protection of social interests other than that in promised advantages.
This power of avoidance has no relation to bargain consideration or the
making of contracts. This is also true in the case of conditional contracts; something other than consideration is involved. For example, if
an infant promised to do something if he chose to, such a promise would
concededly be illusory. Similarly, if an infant promised to forbear to
sue an adult on a claim that was doubtful or that he did not reasonably
and honestly believe in, there would be no consideration for the adult's
promise because the infant did not promise to give up a privilege. In
other words, to furnish bargain consideration the infant must promise
to do, or must do, just what an adult would be required to promise or
do; and a limited power of avoidance, whether given to a person (infant
or adult) by contract or by law,.has nothing whatever to do with bargain
consideration. In the case of Gwrfein v.Werbelovsky,3 3 an adult reserved
a power of avoidance but the court had no difficulty in finding bargain
consideration in the sense of a legal right, power, privilege, or immunity.
It was therefore held that the adult's promise was not illusory. Thus
the choice is really between an illusory promise and the promise of a
legal right, power, privilege or immunity. There is no third alternative
of "any act or promise," such as is found in the Restatement.
Equally fallacious is the suggestion that, in the case of a promise by
a third party to a person already under legal duty, the bargain consideration consists of benefit to the promisor, because in such cases there can
always be found detriment to the promisee. 34 For the suggestion to be
valid there would have to be actual benefit to the promisor and not mere
detriment to the promisee. In fact there are many cases of bargain consideration where there has been detriment to the promisee without benefit
to the promisor, and no cases of benefit to the promisor without detriment to the promisee. 35 The detriment in all cases has, of course, been
a legal right, power, privilege or immunity, given or promised.
CONDITIONS

Text writers have habitually classified conditions in contracts as
express and constructive on the one hand, and precedent, concurrent
33. 97 Conn. 703, 118 AtI. 32 (1922).
34. Morgan, Benefit to the Promissor as Consideration for a Second Promise for

the Same Act, 1 MINN. L. REv. 383 (1917).
35. McDevitt v. Stokes, 174 Ky.' 515, 192 S.W. 681 (1917).
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and subsequent on the other; and the Restatement has followed this
usual practice. 3 6 But these two classifications offer little assistance in
the rationale of the law of conditions. Express and constructive conditions relate to the methods whereby conditions are created: express by
the parties; and constructive, by the law. Their significance is found in
the difference in operative effect given them by the courts in situations
involving part performance and substantial performance, time-of-theessence, and personal satisfaction. Here the courts are more liberal in
the case of constructive, than in the case of express, conditions. Precedent, concurrent, and subsequent conditions are so called because of
their relation to the immediate performance of some duty. Their chief
significance lies in the determination of the burden of pleading and
proof : the plaintiff has the burden of pleading and proving conditions precedent, express and constructive; the defendant has the burden of pleading and proving conditions subsequent, express and constructive (and
for practical reasons a few conditions precedent) ; and the plaintiff has
the burden of pleading and proving a readiness and willingness to perform concurrent conditions. The most important problems involving
conditions, such as assignment, waiver, impossibility, and breach, are
not brought out by these classifications. For this reason there is a need
for a third classification of conditions as promissory and non-promissory.
The Writer proposed'such a classification in a previous article. 37
A non-promissory condition is a fact, other than a promise, which
either suspends a duty of immediate performance, or a second condition,
until it occurs, or extinguishes such duty or other condition upon its
occurrence. A promissory condition is both a promise and a condition
in a bilateral contract; its performance either suspends or extinguishes
a duty of immediate performance, and in addition its breach gives rise
to a secondary obligation. 38 A non-promissory condition precedent
creates a privilege, but if subsequent, a power. A promissory condition
creates both a privilege (or power) and a right. Since privileges and
powers are not capable of assignment 39 while rights are, 40 it follows
36. Sections 250-253.
37. Willis, Promissory and Non-promissory Conditions, 16

IND.

L.J 349 (1941).

38. An illustration of a non-promissory condition is found where there is a promise
of a buyer to pay a certain sum of money for a suit of clothes, provided he is
personally satisfied with the suit after it has been made, in consideration for a taildr's
promise to make such a suit. Brown v. Foster, 113 Mass. 136 (1873). However, if the
tailor should promise to make the suit to the personal satisfaction of the buyer in
consideration for the buyer's promise to pay a certain sum for it, the personal satisfaction of the buyer would be a promissory condition. Kendall v. West, 196 Ill. 221,
63 N.E. 683 (1902).
39. Marston v. Carter, 12 N.H. 159 (1841).
40. Jemison v. Tindall, 89 N.J.L 429, 99 At]. 408 (Sup. -Ct. 1916).
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that non-promistory conditions cannot be assigned but promissory con42
ditions may be.41 Similarly, since privileges and powers may be waived'
but rights may not, 43 it follows that non-promissory conditions may
be waived, 4 4 while promissory conditions may not.1" 5 The common law
permits the parties to promise the impossible, so that impossibility will
neither prevent the parties "from making a contract nor operate to discharge a contract ;46 but where the parties have mutually assumed some
matter of law or fact as a basis either for their contract or for its
performance, the courts will read into the contract a non-promissory
constructive condition, which is generally subsequent to another nonpromissory condition or to a promissory condition, to discharge the
contract in case of impracticability of performance. 47 Since a breach
of contract is a legal wrong arising from a violation of duty, there can,
of course, be no breach of a privilege or power found in a promissory
or a non-promissory condition, but there can be a breach of the duty
created by a promissory condition, whether express or constructive, or
whether precedent, concurrent, or subsequent.
Since the Restatement has not classified conditions as promissory
and non-promissory, it gives no discussion to rights, powers, privileges
and immunities, or to promissory and non-promissory conditions as such,
and even goes so far, in Sections 260 and 261, as to declare that a
promissory condition is not a condition, although in the sections on
constructive conditions, where the performance of one promise is dependent upon the performance of another promise, practically all of
its illustrations are promissory conditions. Of course, the express and
constructive aspects and the precedent, concurrent,. and subsequent factors are discussed, but the promissory and non-promissory aspects, as
such, are ignored. As a consequence, the Restatement contains almost no
discussion of the topic of waiver, 48 and its discussion of assignment,
wholly omits any discussion of the question of the assignment of promis41. Homer v. Shaw, 212 Mass. 113, 98 N.E. 697 (1912).
42. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930) ; Wittwer v. Hurwitz, 216 N.Y.
259, 110 N.E. 433 (1915).
43. Foakes v. Beer, L.R. 9 App. Cas. 605 (1884).
44. Germania Fire Ins. Co. v. Pitcher, 160 Ind. 392, 64 N.E. 921 (1902).
45. Craig v. Lane, 212 Mass. 195, 98 N.E. 685 (1912).
46. Whitman v. Anglum, 92 Conn. 392, 103 Atl. 114 (1918); King v. Braine, Owen
60, 74 Eng. Rep. 899 (1597).
47. Hawkes v. Kehoe et al., 193 Mass. 419, 79 N.E. 766 (1907) ; Taylor v. Caldwell,
3 Best & S. 826, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (Q.B. 1863).
48. There is such a topic as waiver. Mr. Ewart, in his book WAIVER DISTaBUTD,
has demonstrated that there can be no waiver of rights, but that what is spoken of as
waiver is either estoppel, or election, or discharge; but for some reason he wholly
omitted any reference to the question of waiver of privileges, powers and immunities.
There is abundant authority that these can be waived.
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sory and non-promissory conditions. Although the Restatement recognizes the promise part of a promissory condition and therefore discusses
breach in that connection, it does not explain why there can be no breach
of a non-promissory condition, and, of course, it does not discuss the
possibility of waiver of the condition part of a promissory condition.49
Logically, according to its own position, the Restatement can treat of the
express and constructive aspects and the precedent, concurrent, and
subsequent aspects of non-promissory conditions, but it should not-treat
promissory conditions at all-even in their express, constructive, precedent, concurrent and subsequent aspects-for they are stated not to be
conditions but only promises. Because of its silence, this kind of a
restatement fails to restate the common law. It might almost be said
that there is no restatement of the law of conditions. Perhaps someday
this deficiency will be met.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS

Is the rationale that the Statute of Frauds has the operative effect
of making voidable any non-conforming contract which comes within
its terms defensible? The fact that the Statute affects more than evidence,
as claimed by some, 50 is proved by the fact that a memorandum which is
designed to satisfy it must be executed prior to the institution of the
suit.51 The fact that the Statute affects more than the remedy, as claimed
by others, 52 is proved by the fact that, even when a contract comes
within its terms, the plaintiff may nevertheless recover unless the defendant affirmatively pleads the Statute. In reality, the Statute gives the
defendant the privilege and power of invoking its protection, so that he
may thereby avoid liability if his contract is within its purview and the
requirements have not been met. 53 However, the defendant may waive
his privilege by not pleading the Statute; in addition, he may exercise
his power to satisfy the Statute by executing a memorandum of the
contract.54 These are the same privileges and powers which are given
by the law to an infant, or to a person upon whom fraud, duress, or
undue influence has been practiced. The Statute of Frauds is, therefore,
another illustration of how freedom of the parties as to the determination
of matters of substance in contracts is delimited by social control for the
protection of the social interest against fraud and perjury. The Statute's
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Craig v. Lane, 212 Mass. 195, 98 N.E. 685 (1912).
Reuber v. Negles, 147 Iowa 734, 126 N.W. 966 (1910).
Lucas v. Ditson, L.R. 22 Q.B.D. 357 (1889).
WimLsaIoN, CoxTRAcmS § 527 (1936).
Edwards Mfg. Co. v. Bradford Co., 294 Fed. 176 (2d Cir. 1923).

54. Van Cloosteere v. Logan, 149 Ill. 588, 36 N.E. 946 (1894).
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correct rationale is found in the law of rights, powers, privileges and
immunities. The Restatement does not clearly state what rationale as
to the effect of the Statute of Frauds it adopts, but the best assumption
is that it adopts the rationale that the Statute affects only the remedy.
Hence, if the writer is correct, this is another situation in which the
Restatement has not correctly restated the Anglo-American law.
IRREVOCABLE POWERS AS RIGHTS

One more problem to be considered is whether an irrevocable power
is a right. This involves only the nature of rights, powers, privileges and
immunities themselves. An irrevocable power may be created by a contract, as in the case of an offer under seal. The offeree in such a case has
both, a right and an irrevocable power. An irrevocable power may also
be created without a contract as in the case of the part performance of
an act for which a promise has been given. Is this irrevocable power a
right as contended by the Restatement, 5 5 or only an irrevocable power?
In the case of the posed hypothetical, five different answers have been
given: (1) the part performance amounts to nothing-the power does
not become irrevocable and the offeror retains his power of revocation ;-5
(2) the part performance changes the unilateral contract offered into a
bilateral contract; 57 (3) part performance amounts to acceptance and
creates a unilateral contract;58 (4) part performance operates as injurious
reliance on the promise in the offer so as to create an option contract to
keep the offer open; 50 and (5) part performance destroys the offeror's
power of revocation and thereby gives the offeree an immunity against
revocation and an irrevocable power of acceptance, but there will be
no contract until the offeree completes the remainder of the act.60 The
writer takes the position that the first three answers are either too
unjust or too illogical to be accepted, and that the fifth is- better than
the fourth.
The following is the writer's argument for adopting the fifth
rationale:
(1) the offeror has given the offeree the power to create a contract by the performance of a designated act. There can be no contract
until this power has been exercised, and the power has not been exercised
by the exercise of a part of it;
55. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 45 (1932).
56. Stensgard v. Smith, 43 Minn. 11, 44 N.W. 669 (1890).
57.
58.
59.
60.

Braniff et al. v. Blair et al., 101 Kan. 117, 165 Pac. 816 (1917).
Brackenbury et al. v. Hodgkin et al., 116 Me. 399, 102 Atl. 106 (1917).
McGovney, Irrevocable Offers, 27 HARv. L. REv. 644 (1914).
Los Angeles Traction Co. v. Wilshire, 135 Cal. 654, 67 Pac. 1086 (1902).

CONTRA CTS
(2) if the offeree has only a power he may waive it, but if he has
a right it may not be waived. In the above hypothetical, would anyone
suppose the offeree may not waive his power of acceptance, even after
his partial performance?
(3)
if the offeree has only a power (though it is irrevocable) he
has nothing which he can assign, but if he has a right it may be assigned.
It is believed that in the case under discussion, the offeree would not be
permitted to assign to another his power of acceptance;
(4) if the offeree has a right, the offeror has a duty which he
may violate by breach of contract. After the offeror has broken his
contract, the law would forbid the offeree to enhance his damages, and
thus it would be impossible for him to perform the rest of the act which
the Restatement and Mr. Williston make a condition to the liability of the
breacher;
(5) suppose an offeror makes an offer of reward of $1000 for the
finding and return to him in good condition of an automobile which has
been stolen. A hundred different people immediately begin to perform
some of the acts required for the finding and return of the automobile.
Would anyone suppose that 100 different contracts had been made? If
the offeror should repudiate his offer, would he be liable for the breach
of 100 contracts?
Enough has been said, it is believed, to show that the best rationale
of the hypothetical given is that there will be no contract until the
performance of the entire act designated by the promise in the offer,
and that until that time the offeree has, not a right, but only a power
(though it is irrevocable). An irrevocable power in itself is not a right.
This survey of the law of contracts is sufficient to show that the
fundamental concepts of rights, power, privileges and immunities must
be employed in any correct and effective rationale of both the fundamental
essentials of contracts and of the entire subject of contracts. This conclusion is a complete vindication, as to contracts, of Mr. Hohfeld's
hypothesis that rights, powers, privileges and immunities are fundamental
concepts running through all of the law. It also demonstrates that the
Restatement of the Law of Contracts would have been a better restatement had the American Law Institute used the terms rights, powers,
privileges and immunities in restating the Anglo-American law of contracts, as it did in restating the Anglo-American law of real property. 61
61. See also Roman Civil Law of Louisana. This law has been sadly neglected by
the Anglo-American legal world ever since the time of Lord Mansfield. But a proper
use of the Roman law involves a correct rationale, not only of Anglo-American law,
but also of Roman law.
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